The authors examine how judgmental priming effects are shaped by comparisons. Specifically, they suggest that concept priming involves spontaneous activation of concept-consistent standards, which are then spontaneously compared to the judgmental target. In 6 studies, they used a variety of priming methods (contextual cue, subliminal priming, indirect priming) to test these notions of spontaneous standard activation and spontaneous comparison. Study 1 demonstrates that priming a trait concept activates concept-consistent standards. Study 2 suggests that these activated standards contribute to priming effects. If alternative standards that are not particularly consistent with the primed concept are activated, priming effects diminish. Studies 3-6 show that the magnitude and direction of priming effects depend on the intensity and the type of the engaged comparison. Specifically, Study 3 demonstrates that the magnitude of a priming effect depends on the intensity of comparative processing. Studies 4 through 6 show that the direction of a priming effect (assimilation vs. contrast) depends on whether judges engage in a similarity or dissimilarity testing comparison mechanism--a factor which has been found to shape comparison consequences in other domains.
Few topics have occupied the minds and journals of social cognition researchers more than the diverse effects of priming. On its 30th birthday, it is clear that the seminal study by Higgins, Rholes, and Jones (1977) has launched a landslide of research demonstrating just how ubiquitous and multifaceted priming effects are. A cursory look at more recent demonstrations of priming effects (for reviews, see Bargh, 2006; Dijksterhuis, Chartrand, & Aarts, 2007; Förster & Liberman, 2007) fosters the impression that virtually anything can be primed. Priming effects have moved well beyond the judgmental consequences of priming trait concepts that were demonstrated in the classic "Donald paradigm" (Higgins et al., 1977; Srull & Wyer, 1979) . Increasing the accessibility of a concept via priming not only influences social judgment (Higgins et al., 1977) but also behavior (Bargh, Chen, & Burrows, 1996; Dijksterhuis & van Knippenberg, 1998) , emotion (Lerner, Small, & Loewenstein, 2004) , and motivation (Aarts, Gollwitzer, & Hassin, 2004; Bargh, Gollwitzer, Lee-Chai, Barndollar, & Trötschel, 2001 ).
In combination, this wealth of studies has taught us a lot about the nature, mechanisms, and moderators of priming effects (Higgins, 1996) . At the same time, however, it seems that the wealth of empirical findings may have posed more questions than it has answered. As Bargh (2006) recently pointed out, "These impressive empirical demonstrations have become an embarrassment of riches" (p. 148). In fact, despite--or maybe because of--the wealth of findings, many core theoretical questions remain unanswered. For example, it remains unclear how the same prime can influence different psychological reactions and what psychological mechanisms underlie some of these effects in the first place (Bargh, 2006) .
To help answer these questions, we would like to suggest that it may be helpful to "go back to Donald" and closely examine the psychological mechanisms that contribute to priming effects in person judgment.
Back to Donald: Priming Effects in Person Judgment
Over the past 3 decades, Donald has not only been a dominant character in social cognition research materials but has become the mascot of social cognition researchers. Donald, as we know him, was first introduced to the social cognition community by Higgins et al. (1977) . These researchers asked their participants to engage in a reading comprehension task and to familiarize themselves with an ambiguously described character named Donald who could equally well be seen as stubborn or persistent. Before engaging in this task, however, participants worked on an ostensibly unrelated perception task in which they were either confronted with the word "stubborn" or "persistent." This prior exposure to either of the alternative trait concepts determined how participants later characterized Donald. More specifically, perceptions of Donald were assimilated toward the activated concept so that he was primarily characterized in a way that was consistent with this concept.
This basic assimilation effect has been replicated in a series of studies using different priming methods, different stimuli, and different responses (see Higgins, 1996 , for an overview). Srull and Wyer (1979) , for example, demonstrated that how hostile an ambiguously described Donald was judged to be depended on how many scrambled sentences with hostile content (e.g., "leg break arm his") participants had previously unscrambled and on how much time had lapsed between the priming and the judgment task. Bargh and Pietromonaco (1982) demonstrated that even subliminal exposure to the relevant trait category was sufficient to produce these priming effects on person judgment: Participants who had been subliminally exposed to hostility-related words later judged Donald to be more hostile than did those who had been exposed to neutral control words. But how research participants saw and judged Donald did not solely depend on the activation of broad trait concepts, such as hostility. Rather, Herr (1986) demonstrated that exposure to concrete exemplars also influenced how Donald was judged. In particular, participants who had been exposed to moderately hostile exemplars, such as Joe Frazier, subsequently judged Donald to be more aggressive than did those who had been exposed to moderately nonhostile exemplars, such as Robin Hood.
In all of these examples, judgments about Donald were assimilated toward the activated knowledge, no matter whether this knowledge was activated supraliminally or subliminally or whether it constituted a trait concept or a concrete exemplar. But priming does not always yield assimilative effects on person judgment. Under specific conditions, judgments about Donald may also be contrasted with or displaced from the activated knowledge. In Herr's (1986) studies, for example, Donald was only assimilated toward moderate exemplars. Exposure to extreme exemplars, however, led to contrast. Thus, participants who had been exposed to extreme exemplars of hostility, such as Adolf Hitler, judged Donald to be less hostile than did participants who had been exposed to extreme exemplars of nonhostility, such as Pope John Paul. In fact, whether judgments about Donald are assimilated toward or contrasted away from activated knowledge depends on a complex interplay of characteristics of the activated knowledge and the judged target. More specifically, the distinctness and extremity of the activated knowledge (Herr, 1986; Moskowitz & Skurnik, 1999; Stapel, Koomen, & van der Pligt, 1997) as well as the ambiguity of the judged target (Philippot, Schwarz, Carrera, De Vries, & Van Yperen, 1991; Stapel et al., 1997) critically determine whether knowledge activation leads to assimilation or contrast (for an overview, see Förster & Liberman, 2007) . In addition, participants who become aware of a priming influence may attempt to correct for it and turn assimilation to contrast and vice versa in the process of doing so (Martin, 1986; Moskowitz & Skurnik, 1999; Strack, 1992; Wegener & Petty, 1997) .
Comparison Mechanisms in Person Judgment
What are the psychological mechanisms that underlie such priming effects in judgments about Donald? To answer this question, we would like to suggest that one keep in mind the most fundamental property of the Donald paradigm, namely, the fact that it is a person-judgment paradigm. The judgments about Donald that are assessed in this paradigm are likely to be influenced by the same factors that influence person judgment in general. One such influencing factor is comparison processes. Indeed, person judgments are fundamentally comparative in nature. To judge another person as aggressive, for example, already implies that this person is more aggressive than others, and this judgment is thus comparative in nature (Huttenlocher & Higgins, 1971) . Consistent with this general notion, abundant research attests that when people judge themselves or another person, they rely on comparisons with accessible standards.
When judging themselves, people typically engage in social comparison (Festinger, 1954) . That is, they evaluate their own characteristics and attributes in comparison to a social standard that is accessible, because it is either immediately given in the judgmental situation (Gilbert, Giesler, & Morris, 1995; Morse & Gergen, 1970; Mussweiler, Rüter, & Epstude, 2004a) or chronically accessible because of extensive prior use by the judge (Mussweiler & Rüter, 2003) . For example, participants who evaluate their own characteristics while waiting for a job interview compare themselves to another ostensible job candidate who is waiting with them (Morse & Gergen, 1970) . In much the same way, participants who judge their own athletic abilities compare them with standards whose accessibility has been increased via a subliminal priming manipulation (Mussweiler et al., 2004a) . Furthermore, in situations in which no comparison standard is directly rendered accessible in the judgment situation, people rely on chronically accessible standards. For example, participants who are asked to rate their own tidiness resort to information about the tidiness of their best friend, a routine comparison standard who has become chronically accessible because of frequent prior use (Mussweiler & Rüter, 2003) .
When judging another person, people equally rely on comparisons with standards whose accessibility is situationally (Herr, 1986; Higgins & Lurie, 1983) or chronically (Dunning & Hayes, 1996; Mussweiler & Bodenhausen, 2002) increased. A series of classic findings in the social judgment literature demonstrates that judgments about others critically depend on which comparison standards are made accessible in the judgmental situation. For example, how hostile an ambiguously described Donald is judged to be critically depends on whether hostile or nonhostile standards were previously activated (Herr, 1986) . Similarly, how lenient a target judge Jones is judged to be critically depends on whether the judgmental context includes lenient or harsh judges, which can serve as standards of comparison (Higgins & Lurie, 1983; Higgins & Stangor, 1988) . As is true for self-judgments, if no comparison standard is immediately made accessible in the judgmental situation, then people also make use of chronically accessible standards when judging another person. For example, when judging the punctuality of another college student, participants activated information about their own punctuality (Dunning & Hayes, 1996) and thus used the self as a chronically accessible comparison standard. These findings emphasize the comparative nature of person judgment.
Indeed, people's tendency to engage in these comparisons is so robust that they even compare the target to accessible others who--from a normative perspective--constitute irrelevant comparison standards. For example, when evaluating their own ability to detect schizophrenia, people spontaneously compare themselves with more competent accessible others, even when they are well aware of the fact that the standard's superior performance is due to his or her prior extra training in schizophrenia detection (Gilbert et al., 1995) . In this respect, people engage in these comparisons quite spontaneously. Whenever they judge a person, they appear to compare him or her with an accessible standard, be this standard accessible for situational or chronic reasons. Such comparisons appear to arise so naturally and spontaneously that they are even engaged with standards that are normatively irrelevant (Gilbert et al., 1995) or presented so briefly that people remain unaware of them (Mussweiler et al., 2004a) .
Thus, in person judgment, people appear to consistently engage in comparisons with accessible standards, standards that are on the top of their minds either because they have been activated in the judgment situation itself or because they have been extensively used in the past.
What Do We Prime?
We suggest that this robust and spontaneous use of accessible comparison standards also allows us to explain priming effects in person judgment. What do we prime when we prime a specific trait concept such as hostility? Clearly, we prime abstract concepts that are closely associated with the primed concept itself. Just as activating the concept "doctor" activates related concepts, such as "nurse" (Meyer & Schvaneveldt, 1971) , activating "black" activates associated characteristics, such as "violent" (Wittenbrink, Judd, & Park, 1997) , and activating "sex" activates "aggression" (Mussweiler & Förster, 2000) ; priming a specific trait concept will activate related abstract concepts. Priming hostility is thus likely to also activate related concepts, such as aggressiveness. According to a spreading-activation account of concept activation (e.g., Collins & Loftus, 1975) , this is the case because the associated concepts are linked, so that activation of one concept activates the associated concept. But the activated trait concept is also likely to be associated with and linked to person representations Wyer & Carlston, 1979) . As a consequence, priming a specific trait concept should render not only accessible associated traits or behaviors but also persons that are closely associated with the primed concept (see also Smith & Zárate, 1992) . Priming hostility, for example, may also render accessible persons who are closely associated with hostility. After working on a priming task with hostile content, participants may thus also have information about hostile persons (e.g., a hostile classmate or neighbor) on the top of their minds. From this perspective, priming hostility would thus also render accessible comparison standards for hostility. Notably, people will typically remain unaware of this standard activation, because, as suggested by Smith and Zárate (1992) , activation of information about specific persons in social judgment constitutes a type of implicit memory. Priming a trait concept thus unconsciously primes a standard.
In light of the abundant evidence demonstrating that people spontaneously compare target persons to accessible standards, it seems only natural that these standards will be used for subsequent person judgments. More specifically, participants who are asked to evaluate an ambiguously described Donald subsequent to solving scrambled sentences with hostile content are likely to compare Donald to the hostile standards that were rendered accessible by the priming procedure.
In sum, the present perspective holds that concept priming involves mechanisms of spontaneous standard activation and spontaneous comparison of the activated standard with the judgmental target. Priming a specific trait concept (e.g., hostility) also activates concept-consistent comparison standards (e.g., hostile persons). Once these standards are accessible, they are spontaneously compared to the judgmental target (e.g., Donald).
Assimilation and Contrast as Comparison Consequences
How can this comparison perspective explain the assimilative and contrastive judgmental consequences found in studies of priming? Recent research on the judgmental consequences of comparison has demonstrated that--as is the case for the consequences of priming--comparisons can yield assimilative as well as contrastive effects on person judgment (for recent overviews, see Biernat, 2005; Mussweiler, 2003) . In fact, which of these opposing effects occurs appears to depend on the same factors that determine the direction of concept-priming effects. For example, just as the extremity of a primed exemplar determines whether judgments about Donald are assimilated toward or contrasted away from it (Herr, 1986) , the extremity of a social comparison standard determines whether judgments about the self are assimilated toward or contrasted away from the standard (Mussweiler, Rüter, & Epstude, 2004b; Smeesters & Mandel, 2006) . Furthermore, just as the ambiguity of the judged target person determines in which direction judgments about him or her are influenced by a primed concept (Philippot et al., 1991; Stapel et al., 1997) , the ambiguity or mutability of the self determines the direction of social comparison effects (Stapel & Koomen, 2000) .
Recent theorizing (Mussweiler, 2003) and research (Damisch, Mussweiler, & Plessner, 2006; Mussweiler, 2001; Mussweiler et al., 2004b; Smeesters & Mandel, 2006) has suggested that assimilative and contrastive comparison consequences are produced by the two alternative comparison mechanisms of similarity and dissimilarity testing. Similarity testing captures a process by which judges focus on similarities between the comparison target and the standard and selectively activate information that indicates that both are similar along the judgmental dimension. When comparing their own hostility to that of a moderately hostile standard, for example, people appear to focus on ways in which they are similar to the standard and selectively activate information that indicates that they are as hostile as the standard. This leads to assimilation in subsequent self-evaluations. Dissimilarity testing captures a process by which judges focus on differences between the target and the standard and selectively activate information indicating that both are different on the judgmental dimension. When comparing their own hostility to that of an extremely hostile standard, people thus appear to focus on ways in which they are different from the standard and selectively activate information that indicates that they are less hostile. This leads to contrast in subsequent self-evaluations. Recent empirical evidence suggests that these alternative mechanisms do indeed contribute to assimilative versus contrastive comparison consequences. Inducing a similarity versus dissimilarity focus prior to comparison, for example, leads judges to assimilate judgments about the self (Mussweiler, 2001) or others (Damisch et al., 2006 ) toward a standard versus contrast these judgments away from the standard. Furthermore, assimilative and contrastive comparison consequences are accompanied by a general informational focus on similarities versus differences (Mussweiler et al., 2004b) . This suggests that assimilative versus contrastive comparison consequences are indeed produced by the mechanisms of similarity versus dissimilarity testing.
If concept priming in person judgment does indeed involve comparisons with spontaneously activated standards as we assume, then they are also likely to be shaped by the mechanisms of similarity and dissimilarity testing. Whether a person judgment is assimilated toward or contrasted away from a primed concept would thus depend on whether judges focus on similarities or differences between the target person and an activated standard. From this perspective, the same factors and mechanisms that influence the direction of comparison effects would also shape the direction of priming effects.
The Present Research
In combination, the two notions of spontaneous standard activation by concept priming and spontaneous comparison with the judgmental target may thus help to explain how concept priming influences person judgment. The present research was designed to provide empirical support for these two notions and examine their role in judgmental priming effects.
Studies 1 and 2 were designed to shed light on the assumed process of spontaneous standard activation and its role in priming effects. Here, we examine whether priming a trait concept does indeed activate a concept-consistent standard. In Study 1, we use a clarification task to assess the accessibility of concept-consistent versus unrelated standards subsequent to priming. If our reasoning is correct, then participants should have concept-consistent standards on the top of their minds after priming so that they are faster in recognizing these standards than they are in recognizing concept-unrelated standards. Study 2 examines the role these activated standards play in concept-priming effects. If priming effects are critically shaped by the concept-consistent standards that are spontaneously activated--as we assume--then activating alternative standards that are not consistent with the primed concept should diminish the influence of priming on person judgment.
Studies 3 through 6 were designed to demonstrate that comparisons between the target person and the standards that are spontaneously activated by concept priming do indeed shape the resulting priming effects. If this is the case, then, we reasoned, the magnitude of these priming effects should depend on the intensity of comparative processing: The more people engage in the critical comparison, the stronger the resulting priming effect should be. This reasoning was tested in Study 3, in which we examined whether the more participants were influenced by priming the more they showed traces of intense comparative processing. Furthermore, if comparisons contribute to priming effects, then the direction of the resulting effect should depend on the nature of the comparison process that is engaged: Whether judges engage in the alternative comparison mechanisms of similarity or dissimilarity testing should thus influence whether priming leads to assimilation or contrast. This reasoning was tested in Studies 4 and 5, in which we procedurally primed participants to engage in similarity versus dissimilarity testing during the person-judgment task and examined whether this influenced the direction of the resulting priming effect. In Study 6, we used a classic manipulation of assimilative versus contrastive priming effects and assessed whether these are accompanied by traces of similarity versus dissimilarity testing.
Across these six studies, we use a series of different priming paradigms, ranging from the use of subliminal priming (Bargh & Pietromonaco, 1982) to contextual cues (Stapel et al., 1997) and indirect concept priming (Mussweiler & Förster, 2000) . We use these manifold priming methods to prime a variety of different concepts in an attempt to ensure the generalizability of the obtained effects.
Study 1
Study 1 was designed to test the hypothesis that concept priming activates concept-consistent standards. To examine this possibility, we primed the concepts of aggressiveness versus intelligence and subsequently assessed the accessibility of specific culturally shared standards of aggressiveness and intelligence. Specifically, we adapted a contextual cue-priming paradigm from previous research on judgmental priming effects (Stapel et al., 1997) . Ostensibly as part of the instructions, participants were exposed to words that are associated with either aggressiveness or intelligence. We have repeatedly found in our research that for our participant population of German undergraduates, George W. Bush is one standard whom they closely associate with aggressiveness but not intelligence. The German TV host Günther Jauch, on the other hand, is closely associated with intelligence but not aggressiveness. To assess the accessibility of these standards, we used a newly designed "Guess-a-Celeb" clarification task. Participants were presented with a series of distorted pictures of a celebrity. The level of distortion decreased over time, and participants were instructed to respond as soon as they recognized the depicted person. If priming aggressiveness puts the aggressiveness standard George W. Bush on the top of participants' minds, we reasoned that they should then be faster in recognizing a photo of him in this task. By the same token, if priming intelligence makes accessible the intelligence standard Günther Jauch, participants should be faster in recognizing him. Thus, we predicted that priming participants with aggressiveness would facilitate recognition of the aggressiveness standard George W. Bush. Priming participants with intelligence, however, should facilitate recognition of Günther Jauch.
Method
Participants. We recruited 31 female undergraduates at the university cafeteria as participants and randomly assigned them to one of two experimental conditions. Participants were offered a chocolate bar as compensation.
Materials and procedures. Upon agreement, participants were led to the laboratory, greeted by the experimenter, and guided to a separate booth where they were seated in front of an 85 Hz computer monitor. The experimenter informed participants that they were about to take part in a study on information processing styles that would last about 10 min and handed them a folder with the materials for the first part of the study.
This folder contained the contextual cue-priming task that we had adapted from previous research (Stapel et al., 1997) . Instructions for this task, which were printed on page 1, pointed out that this study was part of a project analyzing determinants of text comprehension and evaluation. Participants were asked to read the instructions carefully. On the next page, a German version of the original priming manipulation was presented, which consisted of three paragraphs that were printed on one page. In the first para-graph, participants were informed that, "We are daily confronted with all kinds of information. Sometimes this information is specific and brief. When we are confronted with such information, we attempt to form an impression that is as good and precise as possible. For example, we will have to work hard to form an impression of the following piece of succinct information" (Stapel et al., 1997, p. 56) .
Then, in the next paragraph, three words printed in bold letter type were presented. These words served as our priming stimuli and were either associated with the concept of aggressiveness, gemein (mean), gewaltsam (violent), hart (tough), or with the concept of intelligence, klug (clever), gebildet (educated), schlau (smart). The final paragraph then read, "Sometimes we have to process more elaborate information. When this is the case, we will have to form an impression of this information in another way" (Stapel et al., 1997, p. 56) . Participants were then asked to turn to the computer, where they would be given an example of such elaborate information.
This task was the Guess-a-Celeb clarification task (see Figure 1 ), which was introduced to participants as a study on face recognition. In this task, we presented participants with a series of distorted pictures for each of two different persons. The level of distortion decreased over time so that it became increasingly easy to recognize the depicted person. Participants were asked to press the space bar as soon as they had recognized the person. One of the depicted persons was George W. Bush, the other was Günther Jauch--the well-known host of the German version of the TV show Who Wants to Be a Millionaire. Pretesting (N ϭ 26) had revealed that in our participant population, George W. Bush is typically seen as aggressive (M ϭ 6.58) but not intelligent (M ϭ 4.77), t(25) ϭ 3.36, p Ͻ .005, whereas Günther Jauch is typically seen as intelligent (M ϭ 6.85) but not aggressive (M ϭ 3.15), t(25) ϭ 7.32, p Ͻ .001.
1 Both pictures were monochrome portraits. To distort the pictures, we used a noise filter (Adobe Photoshop 7.0). More specifically, we created 101 versions of each portrait by replacing one additional percent of the existing pixels with random noise pixels. Thus, the least distorted picture included no noise pixels, whereas the most distorted one included 100% noise pixels. Participants saw a maximum of 101 pictures, starting with the most distorted one. Each picture was presented for 500 ms and was directly followed by the next, slightly less distorted picture. The presentation of the series of pictures continued until participants pressed the space bar to indicate that they had recognized the depicted person. They were then asked to report the name of the recognized person. Each participant saw two picture series, one with George W. Bush and one with Günther Jauch. The order of the series was counterbalanced. Subsequent to the clarification task, we gave participants three additional questions to assess whether they were aware of the true purpose of the study. None of the participants indicated awareness. After completion of all parts, participants were thanked for their participation and given their compensation.
In sum, Study 1 is based on a 2 (Conceptual Priming: aggressiveness vs. intelligence) ϫ 2 (Standard: George W. Bush vs. Günther Jauch) mixed-model design. The first factor was manipulated between participants. The second factor was manipulated within participants.
Results and Discussion
Our central dependent measure is the number of pictures presented to participants until they recognized the depicted person. A total of 5 participants did not report the correct names of the depicted celebrities (e.g., they said "a politician"). Because for these participants, who were evenly distributed between priming conditions, it is unclear whether they correctly identified the standard person, they were excluded from further analyses. Including these participants neither changes the pattern nor the significance of the obtained results.
The means given in Figure 2 show that the time participants needed to recognize the respective standards of aggressiveness and intelligence critically depended on which concept had been primed beforehand. Specifically, participants primed with aggressiveness were faster in recognizing George W. Bush (M ϭ 34.6) than they were in recognizing Günther Jauch (M ϭ 47.4). For participants primed with intelligence, however, the reverse was the case: Here, participants were faster in recognizing Günther Jauch (M ϭ 44.3) than they were in recognizing George W. Bush (M ϭ 56.1). This pattern was borne out in a significant interaction effect, F(1, 24) ϭ 7.88, p Ͻ .01, p 2 ϭ .25 in a 2 (Conceptual Priming: aggressiveness vs. intelligence) ϫ 2 (Standard: George W. Bush vs. Günther Jauch) analysis of variance (ANOVA). In this analysis, neither of the two main effects reached significance: for Standard, F Ͻ 1, for Conceptual Priming, F(1, 24) ϭ 2.48, p Ͼ .12, p 2 ϭ .09. These findings demonstrate that participants were faster in recognizing a celebrity that was closely associated with the primed concept. Participants recognized the aggressiveness standard George W. Bush more quickly when they had previously been primed with aggressiveness. Consistent with our reasoning, these results suggest that priming a concept indeed activates standards that are consistent with this concept. Priming aggressiveness, for example, activates aggressive standards and as a consequence, recognizing one of these standards in the clarification task was facilitated. Participants who had George W. Bush on the top of their mind because they were primed with aggressiveness were faster in recognizing him in a subsequent task. In this respect, faster recognition indicates that concept priming also primes concept-consistent standards. Study 2 was designed to provide initial evidence that these spontaneously activated standards influence person judgments.
Study 2
To provide evidence that spontaneously activated standards influence person judgments, we again used the contextual cuepriming paradigm, this time to prime the concepts of shyness and arrogance. Subsequently, participants judged the shyness and arrogance of an ambiguously described target person named Patrick. Previous research (Stapel et al., 1997) has demonstrated that this method of concept priming typically induces participants to assimilate their evaluations of an ambiguous target person toward the primed trait concept. From the present perspective, such assimilation effects occur because the priming-consistent standards that are activated by the priming procedure are used for person judgment. If this is indeed the case, then activating alternative standards may reduce the magnitude of the priming effect. It has been demonstrated that the extent to which any individual standard influences social judgment depends on the number of alternative standards that are accessible (Bless, Igou, Schwarz, & Wänke, 2000) . Thus, if alternative standards are activated, they may also be used for person judgment so that the influence of the spontaneously activated concept-consistent standard may diminish.
To examine whether the concept-consistent standards that are spontaneously activated by concept priming influence person judgments, we activated alternative standards in our participants and manipulated whether these standards were or were not consistent with the primed concept. Specifically, subsequent to the priming manipulation, participants were asked to list the names of five persons. One group of participants was given no restrictions in this task and was simply told to list five arbitrary people. The results of Study 1 suggest that which people come to the minds of these participants is influenced by the preceding priming manipulation so these participants should list priming-consistent standards. A second group was given a similar task, but with one crucial restriction. Specifically, these participants were asked to list five people that they encounter in their daily lives and that they like. These restrictions drastically reduce the set of people from which participants can draw names, so the listed persons are less likely to be particularly consistent with the primed concept. In line with this assumption, a pretest revealed that only participants in the unrestricted condition listed standards that were consistent with a primed concept. Participants in the restricted condition, however, remained uninfluenced by a preceding priming manipulation. A third group was asked to list five fruits that they encounter in their daily lives and that they like. This final group thus activated nonperson entities that cannot be used as comparison standards in the person-judgment task. In sum, participants were either induced to list alternative standards that are consistent with the primed concept, alternative standards that are not particularly consistent with the primed concept, or nonperson entities. If our reasoning is correct and concept-priming effects on person judgment depend on the use of spontaneously activated concept-consistent standards, then increasing the accessibility of alternative standards that are not particularly consistent with the primed concept should diminish the magnitude of the obtained priming effect.
Method
Participants. We recruited 94 university undergraduates as participants and randomly assigned them to one of six experimental conditions. Participants were contacted at the university cafeteria, guided to the lab, and offered a chocolate bar as compensation for Figure 1 . The Guess-a-Celeb clarification task. Participants are presented with a series of distorted pictures of a celebrity. Each picture is presented for 500 ms. The degree of distortion decreases over time. Participants press the space bar as soon as they recognize the celebrity. Example of stimulus celebrity (George W. Bush) with decreasing levels of distortion (% of noise pixels from left to right: 100, 99, 98, . . . 0). participation in a series of unrelated experiments that they were told would last for a total of about 10 to 15 min.
Materials and procedures. Upon arrival in the lab, participants were greeted by the experimenter and led to a separate booth where they were seated in front of an 85 Hz computer monitor. The experimenter informed participants that they were about to take part in a series of unrelated studies that were administered together solely for efficiency reasons and then handed them a folder with the materials for the first study.
This folder contained the contextual cue-priming task that was similar to the one used in Study 1. Again, the instructions explained that we are confronted with different kinds of information, sometimes succinct, sometimes more elaborate. This time, we used this task to prime the concepts of shyness or arrogance so the instructions included a different set of three bold words as examples of succinct information. Specifically, these words were either associated with the concept of shyness, scheu (mousy), gehemmt (inhibited), zurückhaltend (diffident), or with the concept of arrogance, eingebildet (vain), anmaßend (bumptious), herablassend (contemptuous). The final paragraph of the instructions included the description of a person named Patrick as an example of more elaborate information.
Before reading the Patrick paragraph, all participants worked on the standard-activation task. Specifically, after completion of the concept-priming task, participants were asked to turn to the computer and to quickly help us with designing adequate stimulus materials for a future study. Instructions were presented on the computer monitor. A first group of our participants (control group) was asked to type in the names of five fruits that they encounter in their daily lives and that they like. This procedure activates entities that cannot be used as comparison standards when evaluating the target person Patrick. A second group of our participants (primingconsistent standard activation) was asked to type in the first names of five arbitrary persons. A final group of participants (primingunrelated standard activation) was asked to list five persons that they encounter in their daily lives and that they like.
A pretest with a different set of participants (N ϭ 41) examined whether the latter two conditions differed in the extent to which the listed persons were consistent with a previously primed concept. Pretest participants were primed with shyness or arrogance using the same priming procedure as in the main study. About half of the pretest participants were then asked to list arbitrary persons, whereas the other half were asked to list persons that they encounter in their daily lives and that they like. Participants subsequently rated each of these listed persons with respect to three dimensions (shy vs. arrogant, unathletic vs. athletic, or humorless vs. humorous) on 9-point rating scales. Results indicate that the shyness versus arrogance of the listed person depended on the preceding priming task only when participants listed an arbitrary person (4.13 vs. 5.03), not when they listed a person they encountered in their daily lives and liked (4.57 vs. 4.33). This pattern produced a significant interaction effect in a 2 (Priming: shy vs. arrogant) ϫ 2 (Person Listing: unrestricted vs. restricted) ANOVA, F(1, 37) ϭ 4.1, p Ͻ .05, p 2 ϭ .1. No such interaction occurred for judgments along the two control dimensions (F Ͻ 1). These findings indicate that the unrestricted person-listing task indeed induces participants to activate priming-consistent alternative standards, whereas the restricted person-listing task induces them to activate alternative standards that are not particularly consistent with the primed concept.
After naming these five fruits or persons, which took about 1 min, participants turned back to the folder in front of them and continued with reading the Patrick paragraph. This description was deliberately ambiguous, depicting behaviors that allowed Patrick to be seen as either a shy or an arrogant person (e.g., he doesn't look at the person who is talking to him, he waits until a professor greets him before he greets the professor, he doesn't have much to say when someone else tells him about personal problems but just smiles instead). After reading this description and forming an impression of Patrick, participants were asked to report their judgments on how shy versus arrogant they thought he was. Specifically, participants gave a series of objective judgments about Patrick (Biernat, Manis, & Kobrynowicz, 1997; Biernat, Manis, & Nelson, 1991; Mussweiler & Strack, 2000) . Four of these concerned Patrick's perceived shyness (e.g., "What would you guess, how likely it is that Patrick blushes if he has to speak in front of other people?"), and four pertained to Patrick's perceived arrogance (e.g., "What would you say, how many times per week does Patrick make fun of other people?"). After completion of all judgments, participants were debriefed, thanked, and offered their compensation.
In sum, Study 2 was based on a 2 (Conceptual Priming: shyness vs. arrogance) ϫ 3 (Standard Activation: fruits vs. primingconsistent alternative standards vs. priming-unrelated alternative standards) experimental design. Both factors were manipulated between participants.
Results and Discussion
Because the estimates we used to assess participants' evaluations of Patrick allow for almost unrestrained variance, we excluded all estimates that deviated from the question mean by more than 2 standard deviations. We then combined the eight critical judgments about Patrick into a single score, with higher values indicating higher levels of arrogance. To do so, we reverse-scored the ratings for the four shyness judgments, z-transformed all judgments, and calculated the mean. The resulting mean score reflects participants' ratings of Patrick's arrogance in units of the pertinent standard deviation.
Inspection of the means depicted in Figure 3 reveals that the magnitude of the conceptual priming effect does indeed depend on whether alternative standards that are not particularly consistent with the primed concept are activated. Specifically, participants who listed fruits so that no alternative standards were activated judged Patrick to be more arrogant when they had been conceptually primed with arrogance (M ϭ .30) rather than with shyness (M ϭ Ϫ.19). The same was true for participants for whom concept-consistent standards were activated. They also judged Patrick to be more arrogant when they had been primed with arrogance (M ϭ .28) rather than with shyness (M ϭ Ϫ.15). Participants for whom alternative standards that were not particularly consistent with the primed concept were activated, however, judged Patrick to be similarly arrogant, regardless of whether they had been conceptually primed with arrogance (M ϭ Ϫ.08) or shyness (M ϭ Ϫ.01). This pattern produced a significant interaction effect, F(2, 88) ϭ 3. These findings demonstrate that increasing the accessibility of alternative standards that are not particularly consistent with the primed dimension indeed reduces the magnitude of the obtained priming effect. This finding is consistent with the assumption that the use of standards that are spontaneously rendered accessible via concept priming is a critical ingredient of judgmental priming effects. Taken together, Studies 1 and 2 thus demonstrate that priming a trait concept also activates concept-consistent standards and that judgmental priming effects primarily occur when no alternative standards that are inconsistent with the primed concept are easily accessible. This suggests that the mechanism of spontaneous standard activation by concept priming indeed contributes to priming effects in person judgment.
The second core mechanism that is implied by a comparison perspective on priming is a spontaneous comparison of the activated standard with the target person. Once the concept-consistent standard has been rendered accessible, it is likely to be compared to the target person.
Study 3
If such a comparison does indeed contribute to priming effects, as we assume, then the magnitude of judgmental priming effects should depend on the intensity of comparative processing. Specifically, a comparison perspective on priming suggests that the more participants engage in this comparison, the stronger the resulting priming effect should be. If this dependency holds, then traces of comparative processing should be differentially apparent in participants whose judgments are strongly versus weakly influenced by priming. For example, if the magnitude of a priming effect indeed depends on the intensity of comparative processing, then the more participants assimilated their judgments to a given prime, the more traces of comparison should be apparent.
Study 3 was designed to examine this possibility. Participants were primed with the concepts of arrogance and shyness, respectively, and then judged an ambiguously described target person. In line with previous research (e.g., Higgins et al., 1977; Srull & Wyer, 1979) , we expected target judgments to be assimilated toward the primed concept. Our goal was to relate the magnitude of this priming effect to the intensity of comparative processing. To do so, we measured traces of comparison intensity. We had participants make a series of unrelated person comparisons after they had completed the priming and person-judgment tasks. Specifically, participants were asked to make 10 comparative judgments about the height and intelligence of different pairs of celebrities. Following a procedural priming logic (Smith, 1994) , we assumed that the more participants had engaged in comparison during the person-judgment task, the easier it would be for them to make comparisons in the subsequent person-comparison task. From this perspective, the time participants need to make these person comparisons can be used as a trace of the intensity of comparative processing during the preceding person judgment. Shorter processing times for these person comparisons indicate more intensive comparative processing in the person-judgment task. If our reasoning is correct and the magnitude of the obtained priming effect depends on the intensity of comparative processing, then the more participants assimilate their judgments toward the primed concept, the faster they should be in the person-comparison task. Study 3 tested this logic.
Method
Participants. We recruited 28 university students by contacting them over the phone. Participants were invited to the lab and offered €6 for participation in a series of unrelated studies that they were told would last for a total of about 45 min.
Materials and procedures. Upon arrival, participants were led to the lab, greeted by the experimenter, and guided to a separate booth where they were seated in front of an 85 Hz computer monitor. The experimenter informed participants that they were about to take part in a series of unrelated studies that were administered together for efficiency reasons and handed them a brief instruction to the first two studies. Here, participants were informed that they would first work on a person-perception task and then on a person-categorization task. To reduce the time gap between both tasks, detailed instructions for the personcategorization task were already given at this point. Here, participants were informed that their task would be to make a series of judgments about pairs of celebrities. More specifically, for each pair of celebrities, participants would be asked to make one of the following judgments as fast as possible: "Who is taller?" "Who is more intelligent?" "Who is a musician?" "Who is a politician?" Following this brief instruction, participants worked on two practice trials for each of these judgments. After completion of these practice trials, participants were asked to work on the folder in front of them, which included materials for the first study.
This folder contained the material for the contextual cuepriming task (Stapel et al., 1997) , which was identical to the one used in Study 2. Thus, we primed participants with either shyness or arrogance by embedding words that are associated with these concepts in the instructions. Subsequently, they formed an impression about an ambiguously described target person named Patrick who could be seen as either shy or arrogant. Participants judged Patrick's arrogance versus shyness using the same judgments as in Study 2. Upon completion of the person-judgment task, participants were asked to turn to the computer and start working on the personcomparison task, which they had practiced before. Participants were first instructed to put their right and left index fingers on the respective response buttons of the response box and reminded to provide their answers as fast as possible. Each trial then started with either a comparative question ("Who is taller?" "Who is more intelligent?") or a noncomparative (control) question ("Who is a musician?" "Who is a politician?"). This question was presented at the center of the computer monitor for 2,000 ms and was then overwritten by the names of two celebrities that remained on the screen until participants had given their answer. Participants made a total of 15 judgments, 10 of which were comparative and 5 of which were noncomparative. Immediately after pressing the response key, the names disappeared, and a new question was presented. The 15 trials were presented in the same order to all participants. The sequence of these questions was predetermined: Two comparative questions were always followed by one noncomparative question.
The celebrities that were used in these judgments were taken from some of our previous research (Lindner, Hundhammer, Ciaramidaro, Linden, & Mussweiler, 2008) , where they had been pretested with respect to their perceived height and intelligence. We selected a total of 23 male celebrities that were roughly seen as similar to one another with respect to their height and intelligence. Six of these were musicians, 6 were politicians, and 11 were neither musicians nor politicians.
At the end of the session, participants answered a questionnaire that was designed to assess whether they were aware of a connection between the ostensibly unrelated studies. None of the participants was aware of the actual connection. After completion of all parts, participants were thanked for their participation and given their compensation.
In sum, Study 3 was based on a 2 (Conceptual Priming: shyness vs. arrogance) ϫ 2 (Person Judgment: comparative vs. noncomparative) mixed-model ANOVA. The first factor was manipulated between participants. The second factor was manipulated within participants.
Results and Discussion
Target evaluations. Prior to data analysis, we excluded one implausible judgment of Patrick's arrogance. Specifically, 1 participant estimated the time Patrick needed to appeal to another person to be 10 billion min (approx. 20,000 years). We followed the same logic of data processing and analysis as in Study 2: Outliers were eliminated by excluding all estimates that deviated from the question mean by more than 2 standard deviations. We then combined the critical judgments about Patrick into a single score, with higher values indicating higher levels of arrogance. To do so, we reverse-scored the ratings on the shyness judgments, z-transformed all judgments, and calculated the mean. The resulting mean score reflects participants' ratings of Patrick's arrogance in units of the pertinent standard deviation.
Based on the previous results, we expected that participants' judgments about Patrick would be assimilated toward the primed concept. In line with this expectation, participants indeed judged Patrick to be more arrogant when they had been conceptually primed with arrogance (M ϭ .23) rather than when they had been primed with shyness (M ϭ Ϫ.23), t(26) ϭ 1.97, p Ͻ .04.
Comparison intensity. We predicted that the more participants assimilated their judgments to the activated concept, the more traces of comparative processing would be apparent. Put differently, increased assimilation should facilitate comparative judgments relative to noncomparative judgments.
To allow us to test this hypothesis, we first calculated the mean of participants' response latencies for the 10 comparison trials. The same was done for the 5 noncomparison trials. The resulting scores reflect the time participants needed to perform either a comparative or a noncomparative task, respectively, subsequent to the judgmental priming task. We then created an assimilation index based on our main dependent variable (i.e., judgments of Patrick's arrogance). This index captures the magnitude or strength of assimilation independent of the primed construct. Note that for participants who were primed with arrogance, the highest values for the mean arrogance rating indicate the strongest assimilation. For participants who were primed with shyness, however, the reverse is true. Here, the lowest values indicate the strongest assimilation. To create the index of assimilation strength, the z-transformed mean arrogance ratings for participants primed with arrogance remained unchanged, whereas those for participants primed with shyness were multiplied by -1. The resulting measure thus indicated the extent to which participants assimilated judgments of Patrick to the primed concept. We then tested whether the strength of the assimilation effect was related to the time participants needed to judge the celebrities when these judgments were comparative relative to when they were noncomparative.
To examine this possibility, we followed the suggestions of Judd, Kenny and McClelland (2001) for testing moderation in within-subject designs. Evidence for moderation was provided by a significant regression of the difference between comparative and noncomparative judgment latencies on assimilation strength (␤ ϭ Ϫ.34), t(26) ϭ Ϫ1.86, p Ͻ .04. This finding reflects the difference between the slopes for the regression of comparative judgment latencies (B ϭ Ϫ408 ms) versus the regression of the noncomparative judgment latencies (B ϭ Ϫ201 ms) on assimilation strength. The moderation is illustrated in Figure 4 , which shows response latencies for comparative versus noncomparative judgments at low (M Ϫ 1 SD) versus high (M ϩ 1 SD) levels of assimilation strength. As is apparent from this figure, relative to the noncomparative judgments, response latencies for the comparative judgments decreased to a greater extent with increasing strength of assimilation.
These findings demonstrate that, as expected, the more participants assimilated their judgments toward the primed concept, the more traces of comparative processing were apparent. This in turn suggests that the magnitude of an obtained priming effect indeed depends on the intensity of comparative processing. In this respect, the present data are consistent with the notion that comparisons contribute to priming effects. The remaining studies focus on a different facet of comparative processing to further support this notion.
Study 4
A comparison perspective on priming not only suggests that the magnitude of judgmental priming effects depends on the intensity of comparative processing but also further holds that the direction of the obtained effect (i.e., assimilation vs. contrast) depends on which kind of comparison process (i.e., similarity testing vs. dissimilarity testing) is engaged. Previous research has demonstrated that comparisons lead to assimilation versus contrast depending on whether judges engage in a similarity or dissimilarity testing comparison mechanism (e.g., Mussweiler, 2001; Mussweiler et al., 2004a Mussweiler et al., , 2004b . If priming effects are indeed produced by comparison processes, then concept priming should lead to assimilation versus contrast depending on whether judges engage in similarity or dissimilarity testing.
Study 4 was designed to examine this possibility. To do so, we used a subliminal priming paradigm (Bargh & Pietromonaco, 1982) and combined it with a procedural priming manipulation of different information processing styles (Förster, Liberman, & Kuschel, 2008; Mussweiler, 2001; Smith & Branscombe, 1987; Stapel & Koomen, 2001) . Participants were subliminally exposed to words that are associated with either aggressiveness or kindness and then judged the aggressiveness of an ambiguously described target person named Markus. Before participants worked on these two tasks, we induced a similarity versus dissimilarity testing processing style, with the help of a procedural priming task. Specifically, participants were given sketches of two scenes. Half of the participants were asked to list all the similarities that they could find between the two scenes, the other half were asked to list all the differences they could find. Previous research (Mussweiler, 2001) has demonstrated that doing so induces a focus on similarities versus dissimilarities that carries over to subsequent tasks. If concept priming effects depend on which type of comparison process is engaged, then the induced focus on similarities versus dissimilarities should influence whether priming leads to assimilation or contrast.
Method
Participants. We recruited 38 university students via telephone. They were invited to the lab and offered €5 for participation in a series of unrelated experiments that they were told would last for a total of about 1 hr.
Materials and procedures. Upon arrival in the lab, participants were greeted, led to a separate booth, and seated in front of a 70 Hz computer monitor. The experimenters informed participants that they were about to take part in a series of unrelated studies that were administered together solely for efficiency reasons and then handed them a folder with the materials for the first study.
This folder contained the materials of the procedural priming task, which were taken from previous research (Mussweiler, 2001 ). Instructions for this task pointed out that the purpose of the study was to pretest a set of pictures that would be used in subsequent research on event memory. Participants were given sketches of two scenes, both printed on one page. The top sketch included a man standing in front of a table reaching for a bowl in the middle of the table, a bottle and a few glasses that were also placed on the table, and a fireplace. The bottom sketch included a woman leaning over a table while holding a cup of coffee, a Christmas tree with a few presents underneath, and a fireplace. About half of the participants were asked to inspect the two sketches and write down all the similarities they could find between the two scenes. The other half were instructed to write down all the differences they could find. Previous research (Mussweiler, 2001 ) has established that this task indeed induces participants to focus on similarities versus differences and that these alternative comparison foci carry over to subsequent judgment tasks.
After completion of the procedural priming task, participants proceeded with the conceptual priming task, which was administered at the computer. With this task, we subliminally primed participants with the concepts of aggressiveness versus kindness. We used subliminal primes that were embedded in a lexical decision task (e.g., Dijksterhuis, Aarts, Bargh, & van Knippenberg, 2000; Mussweiler & Förster, 2000) . For each priming sequence, the fixation point ("XXÐ$XX?%XX") was first presented in the center of the computer screen for 3,000 ms, was overwritten by the priming word (15 ms), and then overwritten by the fixation point again (500 ms), which was in turn followed by the target letter string. This letter string remained on the screen until participants had responded by pressing the appropriate computer key. Of the target letter strings, eight were neutral words (e.g., lock) and two were nonwords. The first two trials served as practice trials, in which the priming words were unrelated to the concepts of aggressiveness and kindness (e.g., gate). The subsequent eight trials were the critical ones, in which the priming words were related to either aggressiveness or kindness. The priming words were partly taken from previous research (Mussweiler & Förster, 2000) . Aggressiveness primes were as follows: gewalt (violence), hass (hatred), brutal (brutal), mord (murder), angriff (attack), böswillig (malicious), grausam (cruel), gemein (mean). Kindness primes were: sanft (gentle), friedlich (peaceful), nett (nice), güte (amicability), frieden (peace), liebe (love), süß (sweet), gutmütig (good-natured). After completion of the 10 priming trials, the computer instructed participants to proceed with the next task, which was contained in a separate folder next to their computer.
This task was a person-judgment task, in which participants were instructed to read an ambiguous description of a person named Markus and to form an impression of him. The description was a German version of the original Donald paragraph (Srull & Wyer, 1979 ) that has been successfully used in previous research (Mussweiler & Förster, 2000; Mussweiler & Neumann, 2000) . In this description, the target person was described as performing a number of ambiguously aggressive behaviors (e.g., denying a salesperson entry into his apartment, refusing to pay the rent until the landlord repaints the apartment). Previous research has demonstrated that this paragraph is ambiguous with respect to its evaluative implications (Mussweiler & Neumann, 2000; Srull & Wyer, 1979) . After forming their impression of Markus, participants reported their evaluations of how aggressive versus kind Markus is by giving three different kinds of judgments. First, participants evaluated Markus along eight bipolar scales, including the critical one that assessed judgments along the aggressiveness versus kindness dimension (1 ϭ aggressive, 9 ϭ kind). The other seven scales were unrelated to the primed dimension (e.g., boring vs. interesting, naïve vs. intelligent). Second, participants indicated how threatening they saw Markus as being along a unipolar scale (1 ϭ not at all threatening, 9 ϭ very threatening). Finally, participants were instructed to imagine a scenario in which they got into a fight with Markus and were asked to estimate the probabilities of each of the following aggressive behaviors: that Markus would yell at them, that Markus would threaten them, and that Markus would get rough with them. After completion of the person-judgment task, participants were debriefed using funneled debriefing, in which none of the participants reported awareness of the subliminal priming. We thanked participants for their participation and offered them their compensation.
In sum, Study 4 was based on a 2 (Procedural Priming: similarity testing vs. dissimilarity testing) ϫ 2 (Conceptual Priming: aggressiveness vs. kindness) experimental design. Both factors were manipulated between participants.
Results and Discussion
We combined participants' judgments about Markus's aggressiveness into a single score, with higher values indicating higher levels of aggression. To do so, we reverse-scored ratings on the bipolar scale, z-transformed all judgments, and calculated the mean. The resulting mean score reflects participants' ratings of Markus's aggressiveness in units of the pertinent standard deviation. An analysis of judgments on those bipolar scales that were unrelated to the primed concept of aggressiveness shows that these judgments remained uninfluenced by the procedural and the conceptual priming (F Ͻ 1.4, p Ͼ .25, p 2 Ͻ .04) for all effects. Inspection of the means depicted in Figure 5 reveals that the direction of the obtained judgmental priming effect critically depends on whether participants are procedurally primed to engage in similarity or dissimilarity testing. In particular, participants who were procedurally primed to focus on similarities assimilated their judgments about Markus toward the primed concept so that they judged him to be more aggressive when conceptually primed with aggressiveness (M ϭ .1) rather than when conceptually primed with kindness (M ϭ Ϫ.49). Participants who were procedurally primed to focus on dissimilarities, however, tended to contrast their judgments about Markus away from the primed concept so that they judged him to be less aggressive when conceptually primed with aggressiveness (M ϭ Ϫ.05) rather than when conceptually primed with kindness (M ϭ .38). This pattern produced a significant interaction, F(1, 34) ϭ 6.39, p Ͻ .02, p 2 ϭ .16, in a 2 (Procedural Priming: similarity testing vs. dissimilarity testing) ϫ 2 (Conceptual Priming: aggressiveness vs. kindness) ANOVA. In this analysis, none of the remaining effects reached significance: F Ͻ 1 for the main effect of Conceptual Priming, F(1, 34) ϭ 3.21, p Ͻ .08, p 2 ϭ .09, for the main effect of procedural priming.
2
These findings indicate that the direction of a judgmental priming effect does indeed depend on the type of comparison process that is engaged.
3 An induced focus on similarities versus differences influences whether concept priming leads to assimilation or contrast. This pattern perfectly maps onto similar findings in paradigms that more obviously involve comparison processes, such as social comparison (see Mussweiler, 2003 , for a review) and thus further suggests that comparison processes do indeed play a critical role in concept priming. Study 5 was designed to conceptually replicate this finding with a markedly different priming paradigm.
Study 5
In particular, we again primed the concept of aggressiveness, this time, however, in an indirect manner (Mussweiler & Förster, 2000) . We made use of the fact that for women, a close link exists between activation of the sex concept and judgments of aggressiveness. Previous research has demonstrated that activating the sex concept also activates the concept of aggressiveness, so that female participants who were primed with sex-related words judged a male target to be more aggressive (Mussweiler & Förster, 2000) . If this indirect priming effect is also produced by comparison mechanisms, then again the direction of the obtained priming effect should depend on whether participants are induced to engage in a similarity or dissimilarity testing comparison mechanism when judging a target person.
Method
Participants. Female experimenters recruited 47 female university students. Participants were contacted over the phone, asked to take part in a series of unrelated studies, and offered €5 for their participation Materials and procedures. With the exception of the procedural priming task, the materials and procedures closely followed those that were used in the original sex-aggression priming study by Mussweiler and Förster (2000) .
Upon arrival in the lab participants were greeted by a female experimenter and led to a separate booth where they were handed 2 A repeated-measures analysis treating each of the five judgments about Markus's aggressiveness as separate measures yields the same pattern of results. In this analysis none of the effects involving measure as a factor reach significance (all Fs Ͻ 1.5).
3 Inspection of the means given in Figure 5 reveals that the obtained interaction effect is mostly driven by differences in the kindness priming condition. Our hypothesis relates to the emergence of assimilation and contrast, which capture the effects of kindness versus aggressiveness priming relative to one another. As a consequence, whether the obtained effects of procedural priming are stronger in one of the two conceptual priming conditions is extraneous to our reasoning. a stack of five folders. It was explained that these folders contained the experimental materials, that participants should work through these folders in the given order, and that they should read the instructions carefully.
The first folder contained general instructions, which pointed out that participants were about to take part in three independent studies that were administered together solely for efficiency reasons.
The second folder contained the procedural priming task with which we induced participants to engage in similarity versus dissimilarity testing. All participants received prints of two scenes, each depicting 19th century urban squares. The scenes were printed on a single page, one above the other. The top scene depicted a central square with an array of representative buildings, a number of horses, coaches, soldiers, and bourgeois people. The bottom scene depicted a square in front of a representative building with an adjacent park and a number of bourgeois people. Following the procedure used in Study 5, about half of the participants were asked to list all the similarities that they could find between the two scenes. The other half were asked to list all the differences that they could find.
The third folder contained the conceptual priming task, which was identical to the one used by Mussweiler and Förster (2000) . In the instructions, participants were informed that they were about to work on a cognitive performance task that we wanted to pretest for subsequent studies. Specifically, participants were asked to engage in a word-search puzzle. Following Bargh and Gollwitzer (1994) , this word-search puzzle served as our conceptual priming manipulation. We constructed two word-search puzzles, each consisting of a matrix of 19 ϫ 17 letters. The matrix contained a total of 12 words that were located horizontally and vertically. Both puzzles included 6 words that were neutral with respect to sex and aggression: tafel (board), radio (radio), dach (roof), uhr (clock), zeitung (newspaper), and brot (bread). In addition to these, the sex-priming puzzle included 6 moderately sex-related words: haut (skin), feucht (wet), spüren (feel), schwitzen (sweat), bett (bed), and steif (stiff).The neutral puzzle included another 6 neutral words: teekanne (tea pot), bunt (colorful), kalender (calendar), kahn (barge), stuhl (chair), and tasse (cup). In a pretest, a different set of 20 participants (10 men and 10 women) rated the strength of association of these words with sex and aggression, using 9-point rating scales that ranged from 1 (not at all associated) to 9 (strongly associated). Neutral words were weakly associated with sex and aggression (M Ͻ 4). Sex words were moderately associated with sex (5 Ͻ M Ͻ 7) and weakly associated with aggression (M Ͻ 4). For each puzzle, all 12 words were depicted below the letter matrix.
The fourth folder included the person-judgment task, which was similar to the one used in the previous study. Again, we used a translation of Srull and Wyer's (1979) Donald paragraph as our target description. With the exception of the name of the described person ("Martin"), this description was identical to the one we used in the previous study. Participants were asked to read this description and to form an impression of Martin. Subsequently, they rated Martin's aggressiveness with a different set of 10 bipolar scales ranging from 1 (e.g., aggressive) to 9 (e.g., assertive). This set included three critical dimensions that are closely associated with aggressiveness, namely, aggressive-assertive, hostile-self-assured, and belligerent-determined. These critical dimensions were interspersed with seven dimensions that are not directly related to aggressiveness (e.g., self-confident-arrogant, cowardly-cautious).
The final folder contained a one-page questionnaire that used a funneled debriefing technique to assess whether participants were aware of a connection between the ostensibly unrelated studies. No participant was aware of the actual connection. After completion of the tasks from all five folders, participants were thanked for their participation and given their compensation.
In sum, Study 5 was based on a 2 (Procedural Priming: similarity vs. dissimilarity focus) ϫ 2 (Conceptual Priming: sex vs. neutral) experimental design. Both factors were manipulated between participants. We reverse-scored participants' judgments on the three critical dimensions and combined them into one score so that higher values indicate higher levels of aggressiveness. An analysis of judgments on those bipolar scales that were unrelated to the primed concept of aggressiveness shows that these judgments remained uninfluenced by the procedural and the conceptual priming (F Ͻ 1, p 2 Ͻ .02, for all effects). Inspection of the means depicted in Figure 6 reveals that the direction of the obtained judgmental priming effect critically depends on the induced comparison mechanisms of similarity testing versus dissimilarity testing. Participants who were procedurally primed to focus on similarities tended to assimilate their judgments of Martin toward the activated concept so that Martin was judged to be more aggressive after sex priming (M ϭ 7.19) than after control priming (M ϭ 6.03). Participants who were procedurally primed to focus on dissimilarities, however, contrasted their judgments of Martin away from the activated concept so that Martin was judged to be less aggressive after sex priming (M ϭ 5.03) than after control priming (M ϭ 6.17). This pattern was borne out in a significant interaction effect, F(1, 43) ϭ 5.3, p Ͻ .03, p 2 Ͻ .11, in a 2 (Procedural Priming: similarity vs. dissimilarity testing) ϫ 2 (Conceptual Priming: sex vs. neutral) ANOVA. In this analysis, the main effect for Procedural Priming also obtained significance, F(1, 43) ϭ 4.1, p Ͻ .05, p 2 Ͻ .09, whereas it failed to reach significance for the main effect of Conceptual Priming (F Ͻ 1).
These findings conceptually replicate those of Study 4. Again, whether priming led to assimilation or contrast critically depended on whether judges engaged in the alternative comparison mechanisms of similarity or dissimilarity testing. Using markedly different priming paradigms, Studies 4 and 5 thus provide further support for the assumption that comparison mechanisms do indeed contribute to priming effects. Furthermore, the same comparison mechanisms of similarity and dissimilarity testing that have been identified in more explicitly comparative paradigms (e.g., social comparison; Mussweiler, 2003 ) also appear to be involved in judgmental priming. Our final study was designed to provide further support for the notion that similarity versus dissimilarity testing contributes to assimilative versus contrastive priming effects.
Study 6
To do so, we assessed rather than manipulated the extent to which participants focused on similarities during person judgment. Specifically, we applied a paradigm that has been demonstrated to produce assimilative versus contrastive priming effects and assessed participants' similarity focus afterward. It has been demonstrated that priming extreme exemplars yields diverging judgmental consequences in person judgment depending on whether extreme person or nonperson exemplars are used (Stapel et al., 1997) . For example, priming extreme person exemplars of aggressiveness (e.g., Dracula, Stalin, Hitler) leads to contrast effects in subsequent judgments about the aggressiveness of an ambiguously described target person. Priming equally extreme nonperson exemplars (e.g., shark, tiger, panther), 4 on the other hand, leads to assimilation effects (Stapel et al., 1997) . The present perspective holds that these diverging effects are related to the operation of similarity testing versus dissimilarity testing comparison mechanisms. Equally extreme person versus nonperson exemplars shape the comparison mechanism that we assume underlies judgmental priming effects in differential ways because they differ with respect to their comparison relevance for person judgment (Stapel et al., 1997) . Person exemplars, on the one hand, are comparison relevant, so they are directly compared to the target person. For extreme exemplars, this comparison is likely to involve mechanisms of dissimilarity testing. Animal exemplars, on the other hand, cannot be directly compared to the target person (Stapel et al., 1997) , so they shape the comparison process in a more indirect manner. More specifically, animal exemplars are likely to prime the concept they represent (e.g., aggressiveness), which in turn activates related person comparison standards. As is true for spontaneous standard activation following other types of concept priming, these spontaneously activated standards are unlikely to be extreme, so the ensuing comparison is likely to involve mechanisms of similarity testing.
If this is the case, then traces of these comparison mechanisms should be apparent subsequent to person judgment. Following the same procedural priming logic that we had used to manipulate the extent to which judges focused on similarities during comparison, a stronger similarity focus should be apparent in assimilative priming conditions than in contrastive priming conditions. If the assimilative effects of priming nonperson exemplars occur because judges focus on similarities between the target person and a spontaneously activated standard, then this focus on similarities should carry over to a subsequent task. To test this idea, we assessed participants' similarity focus by asking them to rate the similarity of a number of object pairs. If our reasoning is correct and traces of similarity versus dissimilarity testing are apparent subsequent to person judgment, then participants in the assimilative priming conditions should show a stronger similarity focus than participants in the contrastive priming conditions would. That is, the former should see the given pairs as more similar. Study 6 tested this reasoning. 
Method
Participants. We recruited 38 university undergraduates as participants and randomly assigned them to one of four experimental conditions. Participants were contacted at the university library, guided to the lab, and offered a chocolate bar as compensation for participation in a series of unrelated studies that they were told would last for about 15 min.
Materials and procedures. Upon arrival in the lab, participants were greeted by the experimenter and led to a separate booth where they were seated at a table. The experimenter informed participants that they were about to take part in a series of unrelated studies that were administered together solely for efficiency reasons and then handed them a stack of folders with the experimental materials. Participants were asked to work through these folders in the given order.
The first folder included a contextual cue-priming task (Stapel et al., 1997) with instructions similar to those used in Study 1. Thus, participants were informed that the purpose of the present study was to examine determinants of text comprehension. They were told that sometimes people had to form impressions on the basis of succinct information. The examples given for such succinct information constituted our priming words. At other times, people had to process more elaborate information. The example given for such elaborate information was the ambiguous description of our target person. This time, the priming words were extreme animal versus person exemplars that were associated with the concepts of friendliness versus aggressiveness. The priming stimuli--taken from Stapel et al. (1997) , persons who are associated with friendliness (Aladdin, Gandhi, Mandela), or persons who are associated with aggressiveness (Dracula, Stalin, Hitler). The priming words were followed by the description of our target person Markus, which was similar to the one used in Studies 4 and 5. Participants formed an impression of Markus and then rated his aggressiveness on three scenario questions. Specifically, participants were instructed to imagine a scenario in which they got into a fight with Markus and were asked to estimate the probabilities of each of the following aggressive behaviors: that Markus would yell at them, that Markus would threaten them, and that Markus would get rough with them.
After completion of the person-judgment task, participants worked on the similarity-focus assessment task, which was included in the next folder. This task consisted of two parts: (a) a picture comparison and (b) four questions assessing the perceived similarity of different entities. Here, participants were given the two pictures depicting market squares that had been used in Study 5 and were asked to compare both pictures and to list all the similarities and differences they could find. Subsequently, they indicated how similar they perceived four pairs of objects to be, using 6-point rating scales ranging from very different to very similar. These pairs were as follows: whale-dolphin, white wine-red wine, bicycle-motorcycle, and peach-nectarine. Finally, participants were debriefed, thanked, and awarded their compensation.
In sum, Study 6 was based on a 2 (Exemplar Priming: person vs. animal exemplar) ϫ 2 (Conceptual Priming: aggressiveness vs. kindness) experimental design. Both factors were manipulated between participants.
Results and Discussion
Target evaluations. We combined participants' judgments about Markus's aggressiveness into a single score, with higher values indicating higher levels of aggression. To do so, we z-transformed all judgments and calculated the mean. The resulting mean score reflects participants' ratings of Markus's aggressiveness in units of the pertinent standard deviation.
The direction of the obtained judgmental priming effect critically depends on whether participants were primed with extreme animal or person exemplars. Replicating the pattern of results reported by Stapel et al. (1997) , participants who were exposed to extreme animal exemplars assimilated their judgments about Markus toward the primed concept so that they judged him to be more aggressive when primed with aggressiveness (M ϭ .55) rather than when they had been primed with kindness (M ϭ Ϫ.30). Participants who were exposed to extreme person exemplars, however, tended to contrast their judgments about Markus away from the primed concept so that they judged him to be less aggressive when conceptually primed with aggressiveness (M ϭ Ϫ.41) rather than with kindness (M ϭ .13). This pattern produced a significant interaction effect, F(1, 34) ϭ 7.9, p Ͻ .001, p 2 ϭ .19, in a 2 (Exemplar Priming: person vs. animal exemplar) ϫ 2 (Conceptual Priming: aggressiveness vs. kindness) ANOVA. In this analysis, none of the remaining effects reached significance (Fs Ͻ 1.2).
Similarity focus. We combined participants' responses to the similarity-assessment task into one measure of similarity focus. We first calculated the difference between the number of similarities and differences participants listed in the picture-comparison task and z-transformed the resulting score. We then combined this z-value into a mean score together with the z-transformed judgments of similarity for the four given object pairs. The resulting mean score reflects participants' similarity focus in units of the pertinent standard deviation, such that higher values indicate a more pronounced focus on similarities.
We expected that participants in those experimental conditions that produced an assimilation effect would show a more pronounced similarity focus than would participants in those experimental conditions that produced a contrast effect. Thus, participants who were primed with animal exemplars should show a stronger focus on similarities than those who were primed with person exemplars should. The means depicted in Figure 7 show that this is indeed the case. Participants who were primed with animal exemplars focused more on similarities (M ϭ .23) than did those who were primed with person exemplars (M ϭ Ϫ.26). This pattern produced a significant main effect for Exemplar Priming, F(1, 34) ϭ 4.45, p Ͻ .04, p 2 ϭ .12, in a 2 (Exemplar Priming: person vs. animal exemplar) ϫ 2 (Conceptual Priming: aggressiveness vs. kindness) ANOVA. In this analysis, the main effect of Conceptual Priming also reached significance, F(1, 34) ϭ 4.96, p Ͻ .03, p 2 ϭ .13, indicating a stronger focus on similarities when primed with kindness (M ϭ .25) rather than when primed with aggressiveness (M ϭ Ϫ.25). The interaction did not reach significance, F(1, 34) ϭ 1.95, p Ͻ .2, p 2 ϭ .05. These results further suggest that the comparison mechanisms of similarity versus dissimilarity testing contribute to judgmental priming effects. As we anticipated, traces of similarity versus dissimilarity testing were apparent subsequent to the personjudgment task. Specifically, participants in assimilative priming conditions focused more on similarities in a subsequent comparison task, whereas those in contrastive priming conditions focused more on differences.
The present findings suggest that established moderators of judgmental priming effects may be related to differences in judges' similarity focus. In this respect, it is important to note that we deliberately examined one moderator that, on the surface, seems unlikely to involve the differential levels of similarity focus that the present perspective predicts. Because animal exemplars are generally different from the target person, they may induce a focus on dissimilarities that works against our hypothesis. Thus, it seems all the more remarkable, that--as predicted--our results showed a stronger similarity focus in the animal-exemplar priming condition. From the present perspective, this strong similarity focus occurred because the animal exemplars could not be directly compared to the target person (Stapel et al., 1997) . Rather, the animal exemplars prime the concept they represent (e.g., aggressiveness), which in turn spontaneously activates comparison standards, just as with the other priming techniques we have used in the present research. It is the traces of these comparisons with spontaneously activated standards, which involve the comparison mechanism of similarity testing, that we have picked up on with our similarity-focus measure. We will return to a more detailed discussion of how exemplar and concept priming are interrelated in the General Discussion.
General Discussion
When judging others, people are influenced by at least two core tendencies of social information processing: the tendency to rely on easily accessible information and the tendency to process information in a comparative manner. We suggest that these two tendencies are closely related.
Research on conceptual priming effects in person judgment has demonstrated that how judges evaluate an ambiguous person depends on which applicable concepts are at the top of their minds. Increasing the accessibility of the trait concept "hostility" via a priming manipulation, for example, renders subsequent judgments of an ambiguously described "Donald" more hostile (Srull & Wyer, 1979) . We suggest that comparison mechanisms contribute to judgmental priming effects. Such a comparison perspective on judgmental priming effects builds on two simple notions: spontaneous standard activation and spontaneous comparison.
First, we assume that priming a specific concept also renders accessible concept-consistent standards. Because mental representations of specific persons are closely tied to the representations of the traits they hold Wyer & Carlston, 1979) , activating the representation of a trait also activates representations of persons holding this trait. As a consequence, being primed with aggressiveness also puts aggressive people on the top of people's minds. Consistent with this assumption, the results of Study 1 demonstrate that priming participants with the trait concept of aggressiveness allows them to recognize an aggressive standard more rapidly. This suggests that priming aggressiveness indeed also primed an aggressive standard person. Study 2 further suggests that this spontaneously activated standard critically contributes to judgmental priming effects. If alternative standards that are not particularly consistent with the primed concept are also made accessible, then the priming effect is diminished.
Second, we assume that these spontaneously activated conceptconsistent standards are spontaneously compared to the target person. Person judgment is essentially comparative in nature. When people judge a person, no matter whether this person is the self or someone else, they rely on comparisons with accessible standards. This tendency goes so far that person judgments are even influenced by standards that were presented so briefly that judges remain unaware of them (Mussweiler et al., 2004a) , as well as by standards that are normatively irrelevant (Gilbert et al., 1995) . Thus, it seems virtually inevitable that when judging a target person like Donald (Higgins et al., 1977) , judges will compare him to the concept-consistent standards that were rendered accessible by concept priming. The results of Studies 3 through 6 support this reasoning. For one, they demonstrate that the more judges engage in comparison during person judgment, the stronger the resulting priming effect is (Study 3). This is apparent from the fact that the more participants' judgments are influenced by a priming task, the more they show traces of comparative processing. Furthermore, our findings show that whether target judgments are assimilated toward or contrasted away from the primed concept depends on which type of comparison process is engaged. Just as in other paradigms that are more obviously comparative in nature (e.g., social comparison; Mussweiler et al., 2004b) , assimilation effects result when judges engage in a similarity-testing comparison, whereas contrast results when judges engage in a dissimilaritytesting comparison. This is the case regardless of whether the type of comparison process is manipulated or measured. Manipulating participants' similarity focus via a procedural priming task influences the direction of the obtained priming effect (Studies 4 and 5), and participants in assimilative priming conditions show a stronger similarity focus in subsequent comparison tasks than participants in contrastive priming conditions do (Study 6). Thus, a core factor in moderating the direction of comparison consequences moderates the direction of priming consequences in much the same way. Taken together, these findings suggest that the mechanisms of spontaneous standard activation by concept priming and spontaneous comparison with the judgmental target contribute to assimilative as well as contrastive judgmental priming effects.
Relation to Previous Research
The present research extends previous work in a number of important ways: On a methodological level, we have attempted to manipulate as well as measure those psychological mechanisms that--at least from the current perspective--produce assimilative and contrastive priming effects. In most priming research to date, the antecedents of assimilation and contrast that are related to the assumed underlying mechanism have been manipulated (for an overview, see Förster & Liberman, 2007) . In the present research, we make use of this research strategy by demonstrating that inducing judges to engage in similarity versus dissimilarity testing produces assimilative versus contrastive priming effects. At the same time, we go beyond this strategy by also measuring traces of the hypothesized underlying processes. Specifically, we show that traces of similarity versus dissimilarity testing are differentially apparent subsequent to assimilative versus contrastive priming effects. Importantly, both strategies yield converging results and jointly suggest that similarity versus dissimilarity testing critically shapes the direction of judgmental priming effects. This combined research strategy of manipulating antecedents and measuring traces of the hypothesized underlying mechanism has at least two advantages. First, it provides converging and thus potentially stronger support. Second, it allows us to relate different hypothesized mechanisms to one another.
On a more conceptual level, the present findings demonstrate that concept and standard priming are more intimately linked than is often assumed. Previous theorizing and research on priming effects in person judgment (e.g., Moskowitz & Skurnik, 1999; Stapel et al., 1997) have treated concept and standard priming as separate phenomena that may involve different psychological mechanisms. The present research shows that these two types of priming may be inextricably intertwined. Priming a trait concept also primes a standard that is consistent with this concept. This assumed propinquity of concept and standard priming implies that both types of priming typically yield similar effects. In fact, this often appears to be the case. For example, priming moderate comparison standards of hostility has assimilative effects on subsequent judgments of Donald (Herr, 1986 ) that parallel the assimilative effects of priming the trait concept hostility (Srull & Wyer, 1979) . Similarly, priming moderately hostile versus friendly trait concepts and standards in a single experimental design leads to parallel assimilative effects (Stapel et al., 1997) . Thus, the existing body of evidence demonstrates that oftentimes trait and standard priming do indeed lead to parallel effects.
Under specific conditions, however, these two types of priming may lead to divergent judgmental outcomes. Specifically, extreme traits and standards appear to influence subsequent target judgments in opposing directions. Whereas priming extreme traits leads to assimilation, priming extreme standards leads to contrast (Stapel et al., 1997) . The fact that target judgments are contrasted away from previously activated extreme standards is consistent with a comparison perspective on priming effects. In fact, contrast is also the typical judgmental consequence of comparison with extreme standards in social comparison research. Just as comparing Donald to an extreme standard of hostility, like Adolf Hitler, leads to contrast (Herr, 1986) , comparing oneself to an extreme standard of athletic ability, like Michael Jordan, yields contrast (Mussweiler et al., 2004a) . These contrastive comparison consequences of extreme standards appear to result from a spontaneously engaged process of dissimilarity testing. Consistent with this assumption, it has been demonstrated that subsequent to such contrastive comparisons, judges show a generalized focus on differences (Mussweiler et al., 2004b) .
In light of this evidence, it may seem surprising--at least at first sight--that priming extreme traits sometimes leads to assimilation rather than contrast. We suspect that this divergence between concept and exemplar priming may result from two factors: differential availability of moderate and extreme standards and the activation of multiple standards. First, at least for some dimensions, people may have little exposure to extreme others, so appropriate concept-consistent standards that could be spontaneously activated by concept priming are less likely to be available. We may, for example, be often exposed to people who are somewhat shy, but most of us will hardly be in contact with extremely shy others because such individuals will try to restrain themselves from social interaction. In some instances, judges who are primed with extreme concepts may thus not have equally extreme standards available that could be spontaneously activated. As a consequence, the dissimilarity-testing comparison mechanism that appears to be responsible for contrast effects is unlikely to be engaged. Second, concept priming is unlikely to activate only one concept-consistent standard. In fact, recent social comparison research has demonstrated that person judgment involves the simul-taneous spontaneous activation of several standards (Corcoran & Mussweiler, 2007a) . Because a trait concept is likely to be linked with several person representations Wyer & Carlston, 1979) , priming the concept will prime several conceptconsistent standards. These will typically include moderate as well as extreme standards. Social comparison research suggests that in a situation in which multiple standards with different levels of extremity are rendered accessible by concept priming, moderate standards are more likely to be selected and influence the judgment process than extreme standards. This is the case because similarity on the judgmental dimension is a central determinant of standard selection (Festinger, 1954; Wheeler, 1966) , so that--unless an extreme target is to be judged--judges are likely to primarily rely on moderate standards in person judgment. Taken together, this reasoning suggests that the diverging effects of concept and standard priming may occur because extreme standards are less likely to be activated by concept priming and even if activated are less likely to be used in the judgment process than simultaneously activated moderate standards. On a more general level, the diverging effects of concept and standard priming thus appear to be related to differences in the scope and flexibility of standard activation and use. Standard priming, on the one hand, explicitly provides participants with a limited number of standards. Because these are directly given, they are likely to be directly compared to the target, without an intervening choice or selection process. Concept priming, on the other hand, is likely to activate a broader range of standards that may or may not be used for comparison, depending on whether they meet typical criteria for standard use (e.g., similarity ; Festinger, 1954) .
Furthermore, the present findings extend previous research by emphasizing the flexible nature of priming effects. Previous research has demonstrated that subtly priming a trait concept leads to robust and reliable assimilation effects in judgments about ambiguous others (Higgins et al., 1977; Srull & Wyer, 1979; Stapel et al., 1997) . The present findings demonstrate that the magnitude and direction of the obtained priming effect depends on the intensity and the type of comparison process that is engaged. The more judges rely on comparison while judging the target person, the stronger the resulting priming effect. Furthermore, assimilative priming effects appear to result only when judges engage in a similarity-testing comparison, whereas contrast results when they engage in dissimilarity testing. Previous reasoning and research (Mussweiler, 2003) have emphasized that similarity testing typically constitutes the default comparison mechanism. Thus, as also appears to be the case in priming research, assimilation constitutes the default judgmental effect.
In addition, the present research extends previous treatments of the role comparisons play in priming effects. This becomes most readily apparent when one takes a closer look at how the present perspective relates to other models of judgmental priming effects, which also incorporate comparison processes.
Relation to Classic Models of Judgmental Priming Effects
Comparisons also play a core role in classic accounts of judgmental priming effects (Herr, 1986; Philippot et al., 1991; , including the inclusion/exclusion model (Schwarz & Bless, 1992 and the interpretation/comparison model (Stapel, 2007; Stapel et al., 1997 ; for a more detailed comparison of these different models, see Mussweiler, 2007) . On an abstract level, the present perspective thus echoes these classic accounts in emphasizing that comparisons contribute critically to priming effects on person judgment. On a more concrete level, however, comparisons are conceptualized in markedly different ways in these models. First, the present account conceptualizes comparisons as the driving force behind assimilative as well as contrastive priming effects. Similarity-testing comparisons lead to assimilation, whereas dissimilarity-testing comparisons lead to contrast. Assimilation and contrast are thus both conceptualized as comparison consequences. The classic accounts, however, see only contrast as a comparison consequence and propose other noncomparative mechanisms as the basis for assimilation. Specifically, they suggest that target judgments are typically assimilated toward activated knowledge because the activated knowledge is "included in the representation formed of the target" (Schwarz & Bless, 2007, p.121) or because it is used as an "interpretation frame that gives meaning to and makes sense of stimuli" (Stapel, 2007, p. 151) . In this respect, the present account extends the scope of comparison influences in priming and attributes more importance to comparison mechanisms. Comparisons are seen as the core underlying mechanism of priming effects. Second, the psychological mechanisms that are held responsible for the judgmental effects of comparison are quite different. The classic accounts invoke a scale-anchoring mechanism as the driving force behind comparison effects in judgmental priming. Here, the assumption is that a comparison standard may serve as a reference point in interpreting and anchoring the critical judgment scale. Anchoring a judgment scale with a high standard, for example, shifts the scale toward this standard, so that lower ratings are given to the target (Biernat & Manis, 1994; Biernat et al., 1991; Ostrom & Upshaw, 1968) . This scale-anchoring process is quite different from the process of selectively searching for and activating a specific subset of target knowledge vis-à-vis the comparison standard that is captured by a selective accessibility perspective.
These differences in effect and process may stem from the fact that the alternative perspectives focus on different processing stages. The selective-accessibility model focuses on the process of generating target knowledge in light of and in comparison to accessible context knowledge. The classic accounts, on the other hand, focus on the use of accessible context knowledge in the process of interpreting the target and forming an evaluation of it. Whereas the selective-accessibility model is primarily concerned with mechanisms of knowledge activation, the classic models are primarily concerned with knowledge use. Clearly, to some extent these processing stages will work in tandem. Before the target can be compared to an activated standard, for example, it first has to be interpreted to some extent. This interpretation is likely to be shaped by the mechanisms that are captured by the classic models. Furthermore, once a particular set of target knowledge has become accessible via the selective-accessibility mechanism, the basic principles that guide knowledge use (e.g., applicability; Higgins et al., 1977) will determine its judgmental effects. In this respect, it is clear that the classic and current perspectives on priming effects are complementary rather than mutually exclusive: The different mechanisms are likely to work together to produce the rich variety of ways in which conceptual priming influences person judgment.
At the same time, the present perspective has a number of implications--some of them tested in the present research--that are difficult to derive from the classic accounts. First, a comparison perspective on priming effects holds that the magnitude of assimilative priming effects depends on the intensity of comparative processing. Consistent with this assumption, Study 3 demonstrates that traces of more intense comparative processing are apparent the more participants assimilate their judgments to the primed concept. Second, the current account holds that assimilative and contrastive priming effects should be accompanied by differential levels of similarity focus, as is demonstrated in Study 6. Third, the present perspective suggests that priming effects critically depend on the availability of prime-consistent standards. To the extent that these differ for different concepts, judges, or situations, different priming effects are likely to result. Priming a concept for which only extreme standards exist, for example, is more likely to yield contrast than priming a concept for which moderate standards are readily available. By the same token, judges who have only extreme standards for a primed concept available are more likely to show contrast than those who also have moderate standards in their cognitive repertoire. In this respect, the present perspective suggests that priming effects may be more diverse and multifaceted than was previously assumed. This latter speculation remains to be tested empirically.
Implications and Future Perspectives
A comparison perspective on priming effects holds a number of additional implications and novel perspectives. Most priming research focuses on conceptual priming of traits (Higgins et al., 1977) , exemplars (Herr, 1986) , or stereotypes (Devine, 1989) . In the present research, we have combined such priming of different concepts with priming of different information-processing styles (Smith, 1994 ). Our studies demonstrate that the same conceptually primed trait has markedly different effects, depending on which type of information-processing mechanism is primed in parallel. If participants are procedurally primed to engage in similarity testing, for example, they assimilate target judgments toward the activated concept. If they are primed to engage in dissimilarity testing, however, they contrast target judgments away from the very same concept (Studies 4 and 5). The present findings thus emphasize that to understand the nature of priming effects, one has to take into account both content and process and identify which psychological mechanisms operate on which conceptual knowledge.
On this level of analysis, the present findings are thus consistent with previous demonstrations of procedural modulations of the direction of judgmental priming effects. For one, it has been demonstrated that whether person judgment is assimilated toward or contrasted away from a primed concept depends on whether processing styles of interpretation versus comparison have been activated (Stapel & Koomen, 2001) . Because interpretation versus comparison (Stapel, 2007) and similarity versus dissimilarity testing focus on different processing stages--as the above discussion points out--these processing styles are likely to be relatively independent. In addition, a recent study (Förster et al., 2008) has shown that whether concept priming leads to assimilation versus contrast depends on whether judges have been induced to engage in global versus local thinking. Specifically, inducing a detailoriented local processing style led participants to contrast person judgments away from a primed concept. Inducing a broad global processing style, however, led them to assimilate person judgments toward a primed concept. In our view, there is no a priori reason to assume that the detection of similarities or differences is tied to a particular level of abstraction. Person comparison is a good case in point. For virtually any two persons, similarities and differences can be found on a local as well as a global level. On a more local level, two persons may, for example, be similar or different with respect to the color of their eyes, hair, or skin. On a more global level, they may be similar or different with respect to some of the numerous social categories (gender, ethnicity, nationality, profession, etc.) they belong to. Whether similarity versus dissimilarity testing on the one hand and local versus global processing on the other are indeed independent--as this example suggests--is an open empirical question. In this respect, future researchers will have to examine how the different processing styles of interpretation versus comparison, global versus local thinking, and similarity versus dissimilarity testing are interrelated.
As a first step, we have started to examine whether boundary conditions that have been linked to the operation of other processing styles (i.e., interpretation vs. comparison) entail differential activation of similarity-versus dissimilarity-testing comparison mechanisms. More specifically, Study 6 examined whether one moderator of the direction of judgmental priming effects--namely whether person or animal exemplars are primed--is accompanied by differential traces of similarity and dissimilarity testing. In fact, subsequent to the person-judgment task, participants in the assimilative priming condition (animal exemplars) showed a stronger generalized focus on similarities than did those in the contrastive priming condition (person exemplars). Consistent with the present comparison perspective on priming effects, traces of similarity versus dissimilarity testing were thus differentially apparent in assimilative versus contrastive priming effects.
These findings are a first hint suggesting that the alternative comparison mechanisms of similarity versus dissimilarity testing may contribute to the effects of different moderators of assimilative versus contrastive priming effects. Other moderators may differentially evoke similarity versus dissimilarity testing in much the same way. One example of such a moderator is the extremity of a primed exemplar. It has been demonstrated that priming a moderate exemplar typically leads to assimilation, whereas priming an extreme exemplar leads to contrast (Herr, 1986) . From the present perspective, this may be the case because comparing the target person to a moderate exemplar is more likely to involve a focus on similarities, whereas comparing the same person to an extreme exemplar is likely to involve a focus on differences (Mussweiler et al., 2004b) . 5 A second moderator for the direction of priming effects on person judgment is people's willingness and ability to engage in effortful processing (Martin, Seta, & Crelia, 1990 ). In particular, assimilation is more likely to occur when people are unwilling or unable to expend effort in the impressionformation process. Similarity testing has been described as the default comparison mechanism that is more often practiced (Mussweiler, 2003) . Consistent with this notion, it has been shown that similarity testing requires fewer processing capacities than dissimilarity testing does (Corcoran & Mussweiler, 2007b) . In light of these findings, similarity testing would also appear to be the more likely comparison process that people engage in when they have few processing capacities available. The fact that under such conditions assimilation is more likely (Martin et al., 1990 ) is thus quite consistent with a comparison perspective on priming effects. A third moderator of assimilation versus contrast effects of priming is target ambiguity. Evaluations of ambiguous targets are more likely to be assimilated toward a primed exemplar or concept, whereas evaluations of unambiguous targets are likely to be contrasted away from it (e.g., Herr, Sherman, & Fazio, 1983; Philippot et al., 1991) . This may be the case because similarity testing constitutes the default comparison mechanism (Mussweiler, 2003) , so judges lean toward searching for similarities. Because an ambiguous target offers more interpretational leeway, it is easier to construe it as similar to a given standard, and thus it is more likely to allow judges to engage in the default comparison mechanism of similarity testing. An unambiguous target, however, is too restrictively defined to allow for such a flexible construal, so that here judges may more often have to engage in dissimilarity testing. Some of the additional moderators of the direction of priming effects could be related to the mechanisms of similarity and dissimilarity testing in much the same way. One exception seems to be effects that result from mechanisms of judgmental correction (Strack, 1992; Wegener & Petty, 1997) , which are best attributed to deliberate disuse of accessible knowledge rather than to different types of comparison processes. In any event, these initial findings and theoretical considerations suggest that examining how similarity versus dissimilarity testing contributes to the wealth of judgmental priming effects may be a worthwhile endeavor. Furthermore, these comparison mechanisms are likely to also contribute to other types of priming effects.
We have suggested that "going back to Donald" and closely examining the mechanisms that contribute to priming effects in person judgment may also further our knowledge about other types of priming effects. Over the last decade, social cognition research has repeatedly demonstrated that priming a specific concept has not only judgmental but also behavioral (Bargh et al., 1996; Dijksterhuis & van Knippenberg, 1998) and motivational consequences (Aarts et al., 2004; Bargh et al., 2001; Custers & Aarts, 2005) . Priming rudeness, for example, leads participants to behave more rudely themselves (Bargh et al., 1996) , and priming high performance motivation leads participants to be more motivated and subsequently perform better (Bargh et al., 2001) .
These behavioral and motivational consequences of priming are quite consistent with the present comparison perspective. In fact, as is the case for priming research, social comparison research has repeatedly demonstrated that comparisons with others have not only judgmental but also behavioral and motivational effects. Specifically, participants' behavior and motivation are often assimilated toward a given standard of comparison. As a consequence, participants who are confronted with a well-performing standard perform better than do those who are confronted with an average standard (e.g., Blanton, Buunk, Gibbons, & Kuyper, 1999; Seta, 1982) . Furthermore, participants who are exposed to an attainable high standard are inspired and motivated by this standard (Lockwood & Kunda, 1997) .
Priming and comparison effects are thus equally multifaceted in that they yield judgmental as well as behavioral and motivational consequences. This suggests that the intimate link between these two fundamental mechanisms may not be limited to only the judgmental domain but may also apply to behavior and motivation. In principle, the mechanisms of spontaneous standard activation and spontaneous comparison that we argue contribute to judgmental effects may also shape behavioral and motivational priming consequences. Specifically, the concept-consistent standard that is activated by concept priming may not be spontaneously compared to only the target of a social judgment task. Social comparison research has excelled in demonstrating that if a comparison standard is easily accessible, it is spontaneously compared to the self (e.g., Mussweiler et al., 2004a) . As a result, the standards that are rendered accessible via priming are likely to be compared to the self and consequently yield the behavioral and motivational effects that social comparisons typically have. Priming rudeness (Bargh et al., 1996) is thus likely to spontaneously activate a rude standard to whom participants spontaneously compare. Because by default this comparison takes the form of similarity testing so that behavior is typically assimilated toward the standard, participants will behave more rudely themselves. By the same token, priming high performance motivation (Bargh et al., 2001 ) is likely to spontaneously activate a high motivation standard to which participants assimilate their own motivation.
Recent research has provided initial support for such a comparison account of behavioral priming effects. Specifically, it has been demonstrated that whether behavior is assimilated toward or contrasted away from an activated concept depends on an induced focus on similarities versus differences (Haddock, Macrae, & Fleck, 2002) . Judges who were procedurally primed (Mussweiler, 2001 ) to focus on similarities among a set of supermodels behaved unintelligently. That is, they assimilated their behavior toward the behavior that is stereotypically associated with supermodels. Judges who were procedurally primed to focus on differences between the models, however, behaved more intelligently and thus contrasted their behavior away from the context stimuli.
Clearly, more research is needed to directly examine whether the mechanisms of spontaneous standard activation and spontaneous comparison that the present research has shown to contribute to judgmental priming effects also shape the behavioral and motivational consequences of concept priming. Going back to Donald and closely examining the judgmental mechanisms that underlie priming effects on person judgment, however, may also shed new light on the psychological mechanisms that underlie behavioral and motivational priming effects. On theoretical grounds, there is little reason to restrict a comparison perspective on priming to the judgmental domain. In this respect, comparisons may prove to be a unifying mechanism that contributes to the variety of consequences concept priming has. This would also allow us to explain why and how priming influences different psychological reactions. Answering the question, "What do we prime?" (Bargh, 2006) , with "Comparison standards!" implies that these activated standards influence judgment, behavior, and motivation. Five decades of social comparison research has demonstrated that this is exactly what activated standards do. In this respect, closely examining the role comparisons play in priming effects may help to take at least some of the embarrassment out of the empirical riches of social cognition research.
